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.Tune 1954] PARR-RICI-IMOND INDUSTRIAL CoRP. v. BoYD 157 
[43 C.2d 157; 272 P.2d 161 
F. Nos. 18625, 18626. In Bank. .June 29, 
PARR-HICHMOND INDUSTRIAL CORPORA'riON (a Cor-
poration), Respondent, v. S. S. BOYD, as County 'l'ax 
Collector, etc., et al., Appellants. 
Taxation-Equalization-Proceedings-Review- Presentation 
Below.~Owner of property may not attack detennina-
tion of board of equalization in court unless he has and 
question of value of his property to such 
[ 2] I d.-Equalization-Proceedings-Review-Pres entation Below. 
-'Where taxpayer attacks assessment as void because he does 
not own property on which tax demand was made, there is no 
question of valuation which must be presented to board of 
equalization as prerequisite to judicial relief. 
[3] !d.-Equalization-Proceedings-Review-Presentation Below. 
~·Where taxpayer seeks relief on theory that tax was illegal 
because levied against the whole ownership interest, instead 
of against limited possessory interest for which he admits 
liability, prior application to board of equalization is not pre-
requisite to recourse to court. 
[4] Conversion and Reconversion- Equitable Conversion.-Doc-
trine of <>quita ble conversion is mere fiction resting on prin-
ciple that equity reg·ards things whch are directed to be done 
as having actually been performed whf,re nothing has inter-
vened which ought to prevent such a performance. 
[5] !d.-Contract for Sale of Land.-An unconditional contract 
for sale of land, of which specific performance would be de-
creed, grants purehaser equitable title, and equity considers 
him the owner. 
[6] Id.-Intent as Determining Factor.-There is no equitable con-
version where the contracting parties, sueh as vendor and pur-
chaser of land, demonstrate a contrary intention. 
[7] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Ownership 
or Possessory Interests.-Where purchase of land from govern-
ment wa~ mad(' conditional on conveyance of merchantable 
See Cal.Jur., Taxation, §§ 230, 283; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 767 
et seq. 
Doctrine of equitable eonversion in relation to taxation, 
note, 112 A.L.R. 23. See, also, Am.Jur., Equitable Conversion, § 2. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Taxation,§ 208; [4, 6] Conversion 
and I-teconversion, § 1; [5, 9, 10) Conversion and Reconversion, 
§ 2; [7] Taxation, §53; [8] Vendor and Purchaser, § 206; [11] 
Taxation, § 289; [12] Taxation, § 288. 
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which uncertain event the down itself 
was held in escrow, and where government consented to pur-
chaser's use of property and to convey title as of Sep-
tember 1947, but subsequently deeds were delivered which 
recited that they became effective June 1, 1949, such reeital 
earlier writing that title would be 
and tax on pur-
tax year 1948-1949 instead of on 
his possessory interest sueh period was illegal. 
Vendor and Purchaser-Liability for Taxes.-As between ven-
dor and vendee, real estate is ordinarily taxable to vendor 
where sale is conditional. 
[9] Conversion and Reconversion-Contract for Sale of Land.-
For doctrine of eonversion to apply in measure of 
tax liability, there must be a contract for sale and purchase 
of land whieh is specifically enforceable at time rights of 
the are and if vendor did not havr~ at that time 
the title which be contracted to eonvey there was no eonv<~rsion. 
[10] !d.-Contract for Purchase of Land.-Where contract binds 
corporation to purchase property if government within reason-
able time conveys merchantable title, and where government 
at time of contract's exeeution did not have such title and 
therefore no right to specific performance, there was no equi-
table conversion to support tax assessments against corpora-
tion. 
[11] Taxation-Recovery of Taxes Paid-Amount Recoverable.-
\Vhere plaintiff's possessory interest in land was taxable; 
but the tax was improperly assessed upon the whole beneficial 
interest, a recovery of tax paid should be limited to difference 
between amount paid and that which properly should have been 
paid. 
[12] Id.- Recovery of Taxes Paid- Review.-Where defendant 
tax officials made no objection in trial court to mathematical 
aecuraey of computation of plaintiff's possessory interest in 
property involved if plaintiff had only such interest, and where 
trial court had authority to enter judgment aecordingly, de-
fendants are in no position on appeal to challen!<P correctness 
of trial eourt's finding of what was actually due from plaintiff 
hased on approved valuation formula for possessory interests. 
APPEAI_JS from judg-ments of the Superior Court of Contra 
Costa County. Thomas F. Keating, Judge.* Affirmed. 
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgments 
for plaintiff affirmed. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Couneil. 
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Francis District (Contra Costa) , 
Charles L. Deputy District Attorney, 'fhomas M. 
Carlson, City Attorney (Richmond), and Frederick Bold, Jr., 
Special Assistant to City Attorney, for Appellants. 
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and John F. Ward for Re-
SPENCB, J .-Plaintiff brought two actions to recover 
taxes paid under protest on certain property in Richmond 
for the tax years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. & Tax. 
§ § 5136-5143.) 'l'he cases were consolidated for trial, 
and it 1vas stipulated that evidence \vould be produced only 
in the first ca3e and that the judgment therein would govern 
the second case. The tax assessments by the county of Contra 
Costa and the city of Richmond followed the same pattern, 
the levy in each instance resting on the premise that title 
to the real property was vested in plaintiff m1 the first Monday 
in March of both years. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has 
consistently claimed that all it had on the respective tax dates 
was, as the trial court found, ''a qualified and contingent 
possessory interest in the form of a gratuitous and revocable 
right to possession''; that the assessment should have been 
made only against such possessory right, and not as if it held 
the whole beneficial interest. In line with plaintiff's admitted 
tax liability on its possessory interest in the property, re-
spective judgments were entered against the county and the 
city reflecting the offset between the taxes paid by plaintiff 
under protest and the amounts assessable because of plaintiff's 
limited possessory right. From such judgments defendants 
appeal. 
As grounds for reversal, defendants argue these points: 
( 1) plaintiff's failure to seek relief from the board of equali-
zation on the alleged improper assessments as preliminary 
to judicial review; (2) plaintiff's possession of equitable title 
in the property on the respective dates as justifying its lia-
bility for the full fee tax assessments; and (3) plaintiff's 
adjusted tax liability as a matter referable to the taxing 
authorities for determination in new assessment proceedings 
rather than subject to computation by the trial court in 
effecting an equitable offset. In the light of the record and 
applicable legal principles, defendants' objections are not 
well taken. 
The property involved is known as Parcels 2 and 5 of the 
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Hichmond of about 115 acres 
with various buildings, wharves, and other struc-
tures used as part of a government \V orld 
War H. At the end of the war this 
the control of the vV ar Assets 
as surplus property, and that agency on 
, listed it with other for sale invited bids. 
The im·itation the bidder to declare the purpose 
for 'Yhich he intended to use the and stated that 
title would be conveyed quitclaim deed without warranty, 
express or It also provided that the successful bid-
der shall ''assume responsibility for and agree to pay hi,; 
prorated from . . . [the date of assumption of pos-
session or the delivery of the formal instruments of eonvey-
auce], of all general and special real and personal property 
taxes which may have been or may be assessed thereon." It 
further stipulated that a minimum of 20 per cent of the 
purchase price should constitute the down payment; that the 
suecessful bidder could not make any sale or lease of the 
property for three years after the ''date of conveyance'' 
without the g·overnment 's consent; and that the invitation 
and bid under it should constitute the agreement between 
the parties, to be succeeded only by the formal instruments 
of transfer. 
On August 15, 1947, Parr-Richmond Terminal Corporation, 
an affiliate of plaintiff, submitted conditional bids for both 
parcels, separately stating the amounts offered for the realty 
and the personal property thereon. Inasmuch as the tax issue 
here relates wholly to the realty ownership, only the bids 
relating thereto need be noted-$820,000 for Parcel 2 and 
$12il,OOO for Parcel 5. One condition was that each parcel 
should be treated "as a unit as to lands and buildings and 
personal property." Another condition (Rider D) specified: 
''This bid is also subject to the ability of bidder to procure 
a policy of title insurance in its name or in the name of its 
nominee ... as of the date of the completion of this trans-
action, in the event of acceptance hereof, showing and 
merchantable title to said property free and clear of any 
lien or encumbrance whieh would substantially affect its 
yalne!' Before bidding Parr had learned from a preliminary 
title report that the title was not then merchantable. It was 
also stipulated that the three-year restriction on sale or lease 
of the property, as stated in the invitation to bid, supra, would 
have to be waived or removed (Rider A). 
BOYD 161 
the ~A'C'A~H~ 
was communicated to Parr in 
that ''under date of 
Assets Administration the sale to the Parr-Hichmond 
Industrial of Parcels Nos. 2 and 5 ... together 
\rith certain and ~MMnr.v>fl 
. . . in accordance with the terms and conditions of your 
offer of August 15, 1947, as amended .... The quitclaim 
deed as prepared will convey title as of 12 :01 a. m. September 
1947." This letter gave "consent to the Parr-Richmond 
Industrial Corporation andjor the Parr-Richmond Terminal 
Company, as the case may be, to enter upon and use the 
buildings, improvements, and property, the 
title to which is being conveyed to you as of 12:01 a. m. 
September 23, 1947, for its account . also "the 
immediate right to resell or lease, terms and 
conditions as specified in your offer of 1947, any 
or all of the buildings, improvements personal 
located on Parcels 2 and 5 without prior authori-
zation from the \Var Assets Administration.'' The letter 
also provided for the eserowing of the down payment: ''Your 
eompany, in aecepting this I.~etter of agrees, prior 
to entering into to deposit with the . . . Title 
. . . the agreed upon initial payment of . . . 
$122,412.42 ... " On January 30, 1948, Parr delivered a 
check in the stated amount to the title company, accompanied 
a letter of instructions in as follows: 
" ... whichever corporation does take title, you are author-
ized to deliver to the \Var Assets Administration the sum 
of . . . $122,412.42 . . . upon their depositing with you a 
Deed duly executed by said War Assets Admiu-
which will vest merchantable title in favor of either 
Parr-Richmond Industrial or Parr-Richmond 
Terminal Company as such determination shall be made .... 
receipt of this letter and the check enclosed herewith 
43 C.2d-6 
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will you acknowledge receipt of same upon the 
copy enclosed herewith so that we may in turn hand it to 
the \V ar Assets Administration as evidence of the fact that 
this money has been deposited with you in the above-numbered 
escrows.'' 
On 31, 1948, Parr acknowledged and accepted the 
''letter of intent.'' During that same month Parr had taken 
possession of both parcels in accord with the letter's authori-
zation, and on the first Monday in March of both 1948 and 
1949 held possession thereunder. It was not until June 1, 
1949, that title passed pursuant to two quitclaim deeds ex-
ecuted as of that date, acknowledged and delivered by "the 
United States of America, acting by and through War Assets 
Administration,'' to plaintiff as grantee-one deed for each 
parcel. Each deed concluded with the statement, ''This 
Quitclaim Deed, executed this 1st day of June, 1949, shall 
be considered effective as of the day and year first hereinabove 
written," which was J nne 1, 1949-the date the government 
actually conveyed title, not September 23, 1947, as recited 
in the "letter of intent." The title company thereupon de-
livered to the government two deeds of trust dated and 
acknowledged on June 1, 1949-one for each parcel-securing 
the balance of the purchase price. Thus the down payment 
was in escrow from January 30, 1948, to June 1, 1949-
16 months. 
As above noted, the government's invitation to bid required 
each bidder to specify the purposes for which he intended 
to use the property. The Parr bids stated that its purpose 
was development of the property as an industrial area, bring-
ing in new industries by long-term leases and by sale. These 
declarations, plus Parr's insistence on the removal of the 
three-year restrictions against sales and leases, make it clear 
that a merchantable title was an indispensable requisite of 
Parr's intended purchase. To that point the trial court found 
that "plaintiff's bid contemplated the long-term lease or sale 
of part or all of said realty to industrial firms desiring to 
locate in the city of Richmond, and . . . that purpose could 
not be achieved unless and until plaintiff could obtain a 
merchantable title to said realty; Rider D of plaintiff's bid 
recited the express condition of merchantable title, and went 
to the essence of plaintiff's conditional bid and the conditional 
agreement subsequently entered into between the U.S.A. and 
plaintiff.'' 
The trial court :found also that under the "letter o:f intent" 
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[ 43 C.2d 157; 272 P.2d 16] 
Parr agreed to purchase the property if, as and when the 
government could convey a good and merchantable title, 
and that the government agreed on its part to convey such 
title if, as and when it could do so; further, that during all 
of the year 1948 the ''contemplated sale or conveyance was 
wholly executory, and at all of said times there were clouds, 
encumbrances and adverse claims upon the title to said realty 
which adversely affected said title to a substantial degree, 
and which rendered said title unmerchantable." The trial 
court further found that on the first Monday in March, 1948, 
there was uncertainty as to whether the government "would 
be able to convey ... [a] good and merchantable title" 
and if so, when, and that on that date Parr's ''only interest, 
right or title'' to the property ''was a qualified and contingent 
possessory interest in the form of a gratuitous and revocable 
right to possession, the reasonable duration of" which was 
found to be a "period of one year." 
The trial court further found that ''As of the first Monday 
of March, 1948, for the tax year 1948-1949, defendant county 
. . . assessed all of said realty against plaintiff in the same 
manner and with the same effect as though plaintiff were 
the owner in fee of said realty with full beneficial ownership 
and use thereof. Said realty was ... assessed ... [at] 
$229,090.00 for real estate, and $335,000.00 for improvements, 
together with an assessment of $25,500 for certain personal 
property then situated on said realty; said assessment ... 
was ... charged to plaintiff upon the assessment roll of 
the eonnty as an assessment against real estate, improvements, 
and personal property, and not as an assessment against 
plaintiff's said possessory interest. In said assessment de-
fendant county ... did not segregate the plaintiff's qualified 
and contingent possessory interest in said realty from the 
fee ownership of the United States, and did not assess said 
possessory interest to plaintiff, but instead erroneously as-
sessed the entire fee ownership of said realty to plaintiff; a 
proper segregation of plaintiff's qualified and contingent pos-
sessory interest in said realty and a proper assessment of 
said interest ... would have resulted in an assessed value 
... of $71,581.00 .... " The trial court also found and 
concluded that the assessments when made by both county 
and city were illegal and void for the reason that the United 
States was the owner in fee of the property taxed against 
Parr, and that Parr's possessory interest had not been assessed 
at all. 




valuation which should have 
before a 
§ 1607.) Plaintiff 
tax years it filed ''a 




resort to the 
claims that 
165 
zation for correction a condition for 
p. 313; Brenner v. Los 
As vms said in Assom·ated Oil 
5, at page 9 
"\Vhile in one sense it is true that almost auy mistake which 
r"sults in an excessive assessment amounts an overvalua-
tion of the of a we think there is a real 
and distinct difference between those cases in which it may 
properly be said that the error is one of overvaluation and 
those eases in which the overvaluation is a mere incidental 
resnlt of an erroneous assessment of which should 
not have been assessed.'' [3] So here 's of 
relief---from an tax because it was levied a 
the whole 
nterest for which plaintiff admitted 
its applieation to the board of 
eourse to the court. (See Un£ted States v. 
:322 U.S. 174, 187 [64 S.Ct. 908, 88 hEd. 1209]; Gottstein, v. 
202 CaL 581, 584-585 P. ; Los v. 
Board 108 CaLApp. 664-665 P. 
5391 0) 
There now remains the principal issue of ·whether the chal-
tax assessments may be supported under the doctrine 
of' equitable conversion. Defendants contend that wl1ile the 
government may have held legal title to the plaintiff 
held equitable title under an executory contract of an 
interest assessable on the basis of the full value as "real 
property" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 104), rather than a mere 
segregable "possessory interest" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107). 
[ 4] The doctrine of equitable conversion "is a mere fiction 
resting upon the principle that equity regards things which 
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are directed to be done as actually been performed 
has intervened which ought to prevent such 
n " (l!J Am .. Jm., § 2, p. 2.) [5] An uncon-
ditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific per-
formance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable 
title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on 
Heal Property eel.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy's Equity 
,Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 
CaL 664, 675 P. 235] .) [6] But there is no equitable 
conversion where the contracting parties demonstrate an in-
tention to the contrary. (19 Am .• Jur., § 4, p. 4; Estate of 
Pfarr, 144 Cal. 121, 128 [77 P. 825] ; Estate of Gracey, 200 
CaL 482, 488-489 [253 P. 921] ; McCaughna v. Bilhorn, 10 
Cal.App.2d 674, 678-679 [52 P.2d 1025].) 
[7] The trial court resolved the question of the vesting 
of equitable title by holding that ''at no time prior to or 
during said tax year was plaintiff the legal or equitable 
owner .... " The record clearly supports that conclusion: 
(a) Parr knew before it bid that a variety of matters-
including uncompleted proceedings in eminent domain-
rendered the title unmerchantable; (b) the government ac-
cepted the conditional bid which called for a merchantable 
title; (c) the escrow provisions in the "letter of intent" 
were tacit admissions by the government that it needed time 
to make the title good; and (d) the 16-month delay before 
execution of the quitclaim deeds accentuated the time consid-
eration required for the removal of all clouds and encum-
brances on the title. Defendants argue that the govern-
ment's letter of September 23, 1947, which was accepted 
by Parr in conclusion of the parties' negotiations as to the 
price to he paid for the property, constituted their contract. 
That letter made no reference to Parr's offer and its condi-
tions as to merchantable title. However, it was followed by 
the goverJJment 's formal acceptance in the "letter of intent," 
and the trial court properly concluded that this latter docu-
ment, later in point of time-January 21, 1948-and incor-
porating the government's invitation for bids along with 
the terms of Parr's conditional bids, constituted the condi-
tional agreement between the parties. The "letter of intent" 
contained the escrow provisions above quoted, which thereby 
became part of the parties' contract. Any doubt as to the 
parties' intentions was settled by the recital in both quitclaim 
deeds that they became effective as of their date, which was 
June 1, 1949. As so executed, the deeds themselves super-
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seded and nullified the provisions in the earlier writing to 
the effect that title would be conveyed ''as of 12 :01 a. m. 
September 23, 194 7," and made it clear that title vested on 
June 1, 1949, and not before. 
Defendants rely on S.R.A., Inc. v. State of Minnesota, 327 
U.S. 558 [66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851], but the facts found 
by the trial court and above discussed clearly distinguish the 
present situation. The two eases have one point in common, 
in that the property in both instances was surplus real estate, 
the legal title to which was vested in the United States. 
However, there are several points of difference which are 
material: (1) In the S.R.A. case the contract was the 
normal vendor-vendee contract, where the government re-
tained legal title only as security for the balance of the 
purchase price and ''in substance [was] in the position of 
a mortgagee." (P. 565.) Here the vendor-vendee contract, 
as modified in writing by the escrow instructions, provided 
for the transfer of title only if and when the government 
could convey a merchantable title, pending which uncertain 
event the down payment itself was held in escrow. The gov-
ernment was retaining title not for security but during the 
time allowed for its agreed performance, and then appropriate 
deeds were to be executed, and notes, secured by deeds of 
trust, were to be and were given for the balance of the 
purchase price. (2) Here the whole transaction centered 
on acquisition of a merchantable title, a matter not at all 
involved in the S.R.A. case, where "[a]ll obligations due 
under the contract had been met." (P. 560.) (3) In the 
S.R.A. case the buyer was "in possession ... under a con-
tract of sale with uncompleted conditions for execution and 
delivery of the muniments of title'' when the purchase price 
was paid in full (p. 561), while here the buyer occupied the 
property under what the trial court found to be "a gratuitous 
and revocable right to possession'' granted by the ''letter 
of intent," an arrangement covering the interval for clearing 
a good and merchantable title, at which time the muniments 
of title were to be delivered out of escrow and deeds of trust 
given back. ( 4) During that interval Parr did not occupy 
the status of a normal vendee as in the S.R.A. case, where 
the vendee had made the down payment and nothing remained 
to be done by the parties except payment of the balance of 
the purchase price and execution of the formal conveyance. 
Here the fact that Parr was not in the position of the con-
ventional vendee during the 16-month escrow period but 
time the rights 
on § ]02, 
. supra, 159 Cal. 664, 675.) 
not have at that time the title 
which he contracted to convey, iJJere is no conversion.'' 
on § 106, pp. 182-188; see also Amund-
1'< :son, 41 S.D. Wi7 170 ?\.\V. 63"11.) 
[10] Here the contract bound Parr to the property 
if the within a reasonable time eon a mer-
At the time of the contract's execution the 
did not have such a title. It was bound, however, 
to exereise reasonable in clearing the title. But 
not then that which it contracted to convey, the gov-
ermnent had no right to specific performance at that time. 
Therefore there eonversion to support the 
tax assessments and its protest thereof must 
be sustained. 
[11] eontend that the trial eourt erred 
in itself 's tax liability rather than re-
1he matter to the tax authorities for appropriate 
Plaintiff has conceded throughout 
that its possessory interest vYas taxable (Iiev. 
§ 107), and therefore that it wonld be "in. 
equitable" for it "to seek to recover taxes which in eqnity 
it should pay." In such cases the rule applies that recovery 
should be limited to the difference between the tax paid and 
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that which properly should have been paid (DeFremery v. 
Austin, 53 CaL 380, 382-383), and that rule was followed 
here. 
In determining the tax on plaintiff's possessory interest 
the trial court followed the formula similarly used in Kaiser 
v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610, which was a valuation method there-
tofore judicially approved in cases presenting analogous con-
siderations affecting possessory rights. (Blinn Lbr. Co. v. 
Cmmty of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. 474, 478-479 [14 P.2d 512, 
84 A.L.R. 1304] ; Hammond Lbr. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 
supra, 104 Cal.App. 235, 244-245.) The tax as so computed 
was then deducted from the amount of tax claimed by de-
fendants, and the judgments herein were entered for the 
difference. [12] In the trial court defendants made no 
objection to the mathematical accuracy of the computation 
of the formula's application if Parr had only a possessory 
interest in the property, but they adhered to the correctness 
of the challenged tax assessments based on plaintiff's equitable 
title to the property for the respective tax years. The trial 
court had authority here to so proceed in effecting an equitable 
adjustment on the tax assessments and to enter judgments 
accordingly. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5141.) Under these cir-
cumstances, defendants are in no position now to challenge 
the correctness of the trial court's finding of what was actually 
due from plaintiff based on the approved valuation formula 
for possessory interests. 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Shenk, Acting C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, J., 
and Peek, J. protem.,* concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
It appears that the plaintiff taxpayer should have first 
pursued his remedy before the board of supervisors sitting 
as a local board of equalization before court action and in 
such action the court is limited to a review of the evidence 
before the board. 
The factual situation should first be clarified. The majority 
opinion indicates that this is a case where taxes were assessed 
against property plaintiff did not own. That is not the case. 
Taxes on real property are not assessed against a person. 
They are assessed against the property. Property may be 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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an unknown owner. & Tax. § 611.) 
iLuO>cac"'c in the name of the owner of real estate does not 
render inYal id an assessment or any tax sale." (Rev. & 
Tax. § 613.) In the case at bar while the entire interest 
was assessed to plaintiff as owner it was 
assessed the property and it is conceded that plaintiff 
has an interest in the property albeit it is a possessory 
interest. The only question therefore, whether too great 
a value was placed on that interest. It is not a case of 
a tax on exempt property or property in which 
plaintiff had no interest. He owned a possessory interest 
and that was assessed and is taxable. In Fall v. Mayor of 
19 Cal. 391, the tax was against a bridge, a re-
versionary interest in which was owned by the city, but which 
the taxpayer had the right to use. The court said (at p. 
393) : "There is no doubt, therefore, that the plaintiff has 
a taxable estate in the property, and so far as his right to 
maintain this suit is concerned, it is immaterial that the 
pl'Operty has been assessed at its full value. The objection 
on that ground does not go to the validity of the tax, but to 
its ammmt, and an application for its reduction was the only 
The property was not taxable beyond his interest 
in it, and in legal effect, the tax upon it amounted to nothing 
more than a tax upon his interest." (Emphasis added.) 
In S. & G. Gump Co. v. San Francisco, 18 Cal.2d 129 [114 
P.2d 346, 135 A.L.R. 595], it was held that where property 
was assessed to a bailee as owner when he merely had a 
possessory right, he could not recover taxes paid under protest 
where he had not applied to the local board of equalization 
for a modification of the assessment and show who was the 
owner of the property. The court cited for its holding, 
Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Los Angeles, 3 Cal.App. 619 
[86 P. 844], where property was assessed to an agent who 
held possession for the owner and the court said (p. 621): 
"Nor are we prepared to hold that, under the circumstances, 
the failure of the assessor to designate the plaintiff's princi-
pals or beneficiaries was sufficient to invalidate the assess-
ment. It had the opportunity of correcting the defect, if 
in any way harmful to it, by application to the assessor while 
the assessment-roll was still under his control, or afterward 
by application to the board of equalization, which had power 
to correct the plaintiff's assessment, either by adding the 
names of the parties ultimately liable, or by transferring 
the whole amount taxed to the assessments of the several 
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being 
dates .. 
r43 c.2c1 157; 272 P.2d 16l 
. But resort to 
rendered unnecessary 
case, the error is one in 
. and the tax is assailed as 
violation of constitutional man-
"Plaintiff contends, however, that its bank vault doors and 
eonnterlines were 'exempt' from taxation under eonstitutional 
and that eonsequently prior to the 
board of equalization was not a prerequisite to the main-
tenance of this action. The contention cannot be sustained. 
'rhe vault doors and counterlines admittedly were located 
within the county, city and district in which were as-
sessed. Clearly, they were property of a nature taxable by 
r1efendan ts .... The fact that similar of others 
had been misclassified as and there-
fore relieved of the burden of special assessment district 
ta:xeoo: would that also be excused 
from paying such taxel; .... It does not however, 
that vault doors and counterlincs were tax 
as claimed. A somewhat similar problem was in 
Los etc. v. Los Angeles 22 Oa1.App.2d 
418 [71 P.2d 'rhat case involved the assessment of a 
leasehold interest in tidelands owned by the Plaintiff 
crmfendcd that since the leasehold had no taxable the 
tax was one on noncx1:stent and resort to the board 
of was not necessary. In that conten-
tion, the court there said, at pp. 423-424: 'But it does not 
follow that if the property belongs to a class which is subject 
to taxation it is nonexistent because under the pecu-
1 iar circumstances existing it is without taxable value ... .' " 
(Emphasis added.) The same rule is stated in Banh of 
A meriea v. 37 Oal.2d 1 [229 P.2d Similarly 
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in the instant case the property was taxable. At least plain-
tiff's conceded possessory interest was taxable, and the ques-
tion is not whether it was property or outside the 
taxing jurisdiction. 
There is no tenable distinction between this case and the 
rules set forth in the Bank case. The cases relied 
upon by the majority do not support the statement that 
resort need not be had to the local board of equalization 
where the person who is named as owner of the property 
assessed is not the owner. In Brenner v. Los Angeles, 160 
Cal. 72 [116 P. 397], the claim was that all of the property 
against which the assessment was made was exempt from 
taxation. In Associated Oil Co. v. County of Orange, 4 Cal. 
App.2d 5 [ 40 P.2d 887], the assessment was on nonexistent 
property and the holding is doubtful in view of the Security 
Bank case. In Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581 [262 P. 314], 
and Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655 
[292 P. 539), there was no question of exhausting the admin-
istrative remedy. 
In any event it would appear that the matter should have 
been remanded to the local board of equalization to ascertain 
the value of the possessory interest and reduce the assessment 
aceordingly, beeause it is that board, rather than a court. 
which has jurisdiction over valuation questions. (Universal 
Consol. Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Cal.2d 353 [153 P.2d 746]; 
La Grange etc. Co. v. Carter, 142 Cal. 560 [76 P. 2411 ; Los 
Angeles etc. Co. v. Connty of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164 [121 
P. 384, 9 A.L.R. 1277].) 
I would therefore reverse the ,judgment. 
